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Security Information

24 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NIE-61: Consequences of Communist Control over South Asia

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was proposed by Mr. Armstrong at the request of Mr. Matthews (Deputy Under Secretary of State). It was initiated by the IAC on 20 December as a matter of routine priority.

2. This estimate is based on the assumption, stipulated by the requestor, that South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Ceylon) falls to Communism prior to either Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The Board regards this assumption as unrealistic and accordingly fears that an estimate based on this assumption is likely to mislead. The Board has endeavored to minimize this risk by the disclaimer which appears in the statement of The Problem on page 1 of the paper. As a further precaution, the Board recommends that this estimate be issued as a Special Estimate with the usual restricted distribution rather than as an NIE. The Service representatives agree. The State representative has reserved Mr. Armstrong's position on this question.

SUBSTANCE

3. All IAC representatives have accepted the present text and no substantive issue is likely to arise at the IAC meeting.

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SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 3/22/80 REVIEWE _____

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NEE-61: Consequences of Communist Control over South Asia

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was proposed by Mr. Armstrong at the request of Mr. Matthews (Deputy Under Secretary of State). It was initiated by the IAC on 20 December as a matter of routine priority.
2. The Board of National Estimates felt strongly that the problem presented was unrealistic and misleading: it would elicit a solemn pronouncement on the obviously undesirable consequences of the fall of South Asia to Communism, without any consideration of the likelihood of such a development; and it would be impossible to present a worth-while estimate without a prior estimate as to how and when the Communists might gain control of South Asia and what the general situation might then be.
3. Despite its complete lack of enthusiasm, the Board considers the present text acceptable, if the estimate must be made. The Board feels strongly that this estimate should be presented as a Special Estimate rather than as an NEE, in view of the special and restricted character of the problem imposed. The Service representatives agree. The State representative has reserved Mr. Armstrong's position on this question.

SUBSTANCE

4. All IAC representatives have accepted the present text and no substantive issue is likely to arise at the IAC meeting.

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